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Abstract
This article aims to narrate a series of peaceful campaigns conducted by Papua Peace Network 
(PPN) for Papua Peace Land. This informal network consists of several groups of civil societies, 
such as religious organizations, ethnic groups, NGOs, and academicians. The PPN has some 
objectives that are to connect conflicted groups in Papua land, and to help both Papuan people and 
Indonesian government preparing an inclusive dialogue. This article results from research between 
2013 and 2017. The data collection used observation of peaceful campaign of PPN, interviews, 
and archival research. This research shows that although a series of peaceful campaigns have 
been conducted by PPN both at the national and local levels between 2013 and 2016, but political 
violence still increases in Papua land. On another side, the national government only focuses on 
social and economic development issues, in particular, infrastructure projects, instead of political 
issues. Government officials involved in peaceful campaigns conducted by PPN had no power 
enough to implement some peace recommendations due to the national government has no a 
roadmap to resolve the conflict between Jakarta and Papua peacefully. The article argues that a 
continuously informal communication between conflicted parties is a necessary condition, but 
it is not a sufficient condition to create a positive peace. Therefore, the National Government is 
strongly suggested to implement an inclusive national dialogue with Papuan people. 
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Introduction
The relationship between Papuans 
and the Indonesian government consistently 
has been in trouble since the integration of 
this region into the Indonesian state in 1963, 
based on the 1962 New York Agreement 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands. 
The conflict between Papua and Indonesia 
became more violent in the 1970s when the 
Free Papua Organization proclaimed the 
revolutionary government of West Papua.2 
Then, a series of political violence conducted 
by Indonesian military is ongoing until the 
present day although the level of intensity is 
lower after the 1998 political reform. Political 
violence in West Papua is the longest separatist 
conflict in Indonesia’s history compared to 
the Aceh conflict (1976-2005) and East Timor 
(1975-1999) (Heidbuchel, 2007: 157; Bhakti, 
Yanuarti & Nurhasim, 2009: 17-18; Wassel, 
2014: 2-5). Other problems in these regions 
are depopulation of Papua natives since the 
2 In this article, the term of Papua and West Papua is 
exchangeable. Papua geographically refers to Papua 
land consisted of the present Papua and West Papua 
provinces, West Papua is a political term used by the 
people of Papua to express their political identity.
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conflicts creates a significant distrust between 
both parties, thus making empathy difficult 
to breed. The lack of empathy complicates 
the implementations of permanent rule and 
regulations to implement peace in Papua 
land. Dialogue is a mechanism involving all 
conflicting parties to identify the problem 
and find a peaceable solution together. The 
real dimension of efforts in resolving Papuan 
conflict-related issues exists in the community, 
including traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms representing some characteristics 
of Papuan culture (Elisabeth et al., 2005).  
Literature Review
Indonesian sovereignty in West Papua 
is not yet consolidated because there are still 
strong resistances to the Indonesian government. 
Although the national government has 
implemented many peace policies, such as 
granting special autonomy in 2001, and ended 
officially military operation since the 1998 
political reform, political violence committed by 
the Indonesian military not yet stop (Lundry, 
2009: 245; Viartasiwi, 2014: 293).  Referring to 
Galtung, Braithwaite et al.’s (2009) said that no 
positive peace in West Papua since integration 
into Indonesia in 1963. Positive peace means 
‘commitment to peace and commitment to the 
legitimacy of the governance arrangements for 
guaranteeing peace and justice.’ According to 
Galtung (1969: 183), negative peace can be seen as 
the absence of organized physical violence, while 
positive peace can be perceived as the absence of 
structural or the existence of justice. Rutherford 
(2012) in the laughing of Leviathan analyzes the 
asymmetric power relations between Jakarta 
and Papua as an obstacle to peace building. 
The other study on Papua, Kirksey (2012, 90) 
mentions that Papua activists are entangled in 
the Indonesian reform movement, government 
security forces, and global market. He suggests 
the need for collaboration instead of resistance 
because collaboration is an alternative for survival 
1970s and marginalization of Papua natives in 
socio-economic development. Although West 
Papua is incredibly rich in natural resources, 
this region is the poorest province in Indonesia. 
These unsolved problems increase distrust 
between the Indonesian government and the 
Papuans. 
Some studies have been conducted to 
analyze conflict in West Papua. One of the most 
quoted studies is the research by Widjojo et al. 
(2008: 1-4) on Papua Road Map. They identify 
four root problems of the Papuan conflict, 
namely: different standpoint of the Papuans 
and the Indonesian government concerning 
the history of Papua integration, human rights 
abuse, and political violence, unsuccessful 
developments in Papua, and marginalization 
of Papuan. These findings are discussed widely 
in other studies conducted, such as ICG (2010; 
2012), King, Elmslie & Webb-Gannon (2011), 
Barber & Moiwend (2011), Macleod (2011), 
Drooglever (2010) and Anderson (2015). 
Nevertheless, both Papua Road Map and those 
studies have no focus on peaceful efforts and 
transformation. Those studies analyze the root 
of Papuan conflict by using structural approach 
and power relation. This study tries to fill a 
gap on the lack of peace studies on West Papua 
issues. Different from those studies, this article 
highlights on peaceful efforts conducted by 
Papua Peace Network (PPN, Jaringan Damai 
Papua or JDP) that mediate dialogue between 
the national government and Papuan leaders. 
Therefore, this article aims to describe PPN’s 
efforts to promote a peaceful dialogue between 
Papuan people and the national government 
of Indonesia.
My research argues that an inclusive 
dialogue is necessary to eliminate the gap 
of understanding between the national 
government and Papuan people. Such dialogue 
is an approach to transform Papuan conflict 
from violence into peaceful negotiation. The 
perspective differences between Papua and 
Jakarta in understanding the root of the Papuan 
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to influence the international world. However, 
both Rutherford and Kirksey do not offer a road 
map to peace building. 
There are several analysis on the sources 
of Papuan conflict, i.e., the political construction 
of Papua identity and political violence 
conducted by the Indonesian military. Chauvel 
(2005) explains that Papuans feel intense 
hatred because they are seen as mere objects 
in decolonizations without a chance to be 
a participant, or in other words, having a 
decolonization without the colonized. According 
to Chauvel, the principle of self-determination 
that is underhandedly done in the 1969 act 
of free choice becomes the centerpiece of the 
Papuan nationalism. There is consistency in the 
discourse that Papuans have continuously tried 
to establish a liberated country, which started 
by the political manifestation on 1961 and 
continued at the international lobby process 
by Nicholas Jouwe on the 1970s until the 1999 
petition for independence by Tom Beanal. 
McGibbon (2006) argues that the growth 
of Papuan nationalism is influenced by the Dutch 
governments’ promise to give independence 
to Papua. However, due to the Dutch’s weak 
power, they refuse to continue any further talks 
regarding Papua’s independence. According 
to McGibbon, although Papuan elites have 
failed in declaring Papua’s independence, the 
promise was a fundamental point that pushes 
contemporary Papuan nationalists to strive for 
freedom. The acceptance of the 1969 plebiscite 
results by the United Nations shows how the 
conflict resolution models regarding Papua’s 
political situation is done through a cold war, 
meaning that the results were made without 
the consent of the Papuan elites. 
Apart from Chauvel and McGibbons, 
Thorning and Kivimaki (2002) also embrace 
the basic Papuan conflict. According to them, 
the conflict is based on the construction of 
“Papua” created by Indonesian nationalists as 
a colonial discourse to legitimate the presence 
of Indonesians in Papua. The stereotype 
planted by Indonesian nationalists shows a 
tendency to underestimate Papuans. Based on 
LIPI research (2004), the central problem of 
Papuan conflict lies in the perceptual difference 
about the construction of nationalism among 
Papuans and other Indonesians. Thorning and 
Kivimaki argue that regarding the political 
rights of Papuans as citizens of Indonesia, their 
cultural, economic and educational difference 
differs them from other Indonesians in a vast 
political discourse. 
Based a study conducted by LIPI (2008), 
as an implication of the military-defined 
Indonesian nationalism construction, the 
efforts to maintain the unification of Indonesia 
is adjacent to the war against potential enemies. 
For the military-dominated Indonesian 
nationalists, the unified form of Indonesia is a 
must. Thus, the idea of separating oneself from 
Indonesia is viewed as a violation of the law. The 
concept of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 
(Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, 
“NKRI” for short) is a hegemonic official text 
on verified nationalism that legitimized by 
military forces. The living example of this text 
occurred during New Order that military forces 
thoroughly represented Indonesia as the state. 
In the Papuan conflict, protests conducted by 
the Papuans against the state policies which 
exclude the participation of Papuans was 
regarded as an act of separatism, like separatist 
movements under the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(Free Papua Organization, “OPM” for short). 
The presence of Indonesian government 
during the year 1962 in Papua marks a 
beginning of political violence. During 1962 
and 1984 precisely, a “secret war” between 
the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
National Army, “TNI” for short) with the 
OPM occurred. Political violence was not a 
mere concept, but a real-life experience felt by 
Papuans as a result of the strategy displayed 
by the Indonesian government to battle OPM. 
Indonesian representatives in Papua were 
mostly military and police officers. Indonesia, 
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as an institution, exists in Papua as a military 
force.  
In the context of the Indonesian political 
state during the New Order, political violence 
was justified as a “holy job” done by the TNI to 
maintain NKRI’s unification. Although the New 
Order regime ended on 1998, political violence 
still continues, even until now. After the fall of 
the New Order, there has been some changes 
of political violence: (i) the military operations 
deployed to end separatism faced questions 
by NGOs and the church, directly creating 
a negative persona of the TNI, (ii) political 
struggles for Papua’s independence took over 
by Papuan intellectuals and representatives 
of the church. However, (iii) the experience 
of having endured political violence does not 
make the Indonesian government, let alone 
the TNI, change their strategy in dealing with 
separatism. Troops are repeatedly deployed 
to prevent separatism from happening. As a 
result, political violence does not decrease one 
bit, even after the Reforms (an era emerging after 
the New Order). 
The Indonesian government established 
Act No. 21/2001 about Otonomi Khusus 
Papua (Special Autonomy of Papua) that 
expanded to Act No. 25/2008, to put Papuan 
conflict end. However, some government 
elites misunderstand the meaning of special 
autonomy, they stated that the transfer of money 
would resolve all problems in Papua (Santoso, 
2012: 2-3). In line with the special autonomy, the 
national government implements the division 
of Papua province and several regencies. 
Developing new regencies/cities has directly 
created an increase of physical infrastructure 
projects and a flow of funds transfer from 
Jakarta to Papua. It is estimated that the number 
exceeds IDR 67 trillion since 2002) consisted 
of special autonomy and infrastructure fund 
(“Penyeleseian Papua” 10 November 2017). 
According to Suryawan (2011: 141), special 
autonomy and division of local government 
only bring Papuan elites more divided and 
fragmented because of political contest. These 
occur due to no significant economic and social 
development in Papua that benefitted from 
Papuan. Therefore, Papuan elites exploited 
division of local government for merely their 
self-interest. 
The special autonomy is not yet successful 
in resolving the Papuan conflict. As prove, 
political violence and tensions between the 
government and some groups of Papuan 
people intensified. In addition, the ideas of 
independent Papua strengthened amidst of 
youth generations such as the establishment 
of Komite Nasional Papua Barat (National 
Committee of West Papua, KNPB) (Wilson, 
2016). The failure of special autonomy indicates 
that there is still a gap in understanding Papuan 
conflict between the National Government 
and Papuan people (Elisabeth et al., 2015). 
The government always emphasizes that the 
root of Papuan conflict is the lack of economic 
development. However, the Papuan often 
says the main problem is not only economic 
development but also the politics of identity 
and human right abuses against Papuan people. 
Therefore, to reduce the gap, it is necessary to 
implement a dialogical approach that ensures 
both sides shall end the political violence and 
bring their problems to the table. 
Public Consultations in Papua Land
Before 2014, the term ‘dialogue’ is 
difficult to be accepted by either national 
government officials or Papuan activist. The 
government tends to stigmatize dialogue as 
an act of separatism. Papuan activist says that 
dialogue is an effort of pacification. Just few 
peace activist or institutions work for dialogue 
between Jakarta and Papua. The campaign for 
dialogue between Jakarta and Papuan people 
has been initiated by a set of peace activists 
in both Jakarta and Papua in 2008. At the end 
of that year, LIPI introduced Papua Road Map, 
which involves the dialogue between Jakarta 
151
Cahyo Pamungkas, The Campaign of Papua Peace Network for Papua Peace Land
and Papua. After the publication, the urgency 
of the dialogue was presented through a series 
of dissemination to the national government, 
parliament, NGOs, religious institutions and a 
list of international communities abroad. 
In 2009, LIPI and Sekretariat Keadilan dan 
Perdamaian (SKP, Office for Justice and Peace, 
Catholic Church Diocese of Jayapura) initiated 
a network of dialogue’s facilitators. The SKP 
hosted a conference in 2010, which concluded 
some indicators of Papua peace land. After that, 
LIPI trained dialogue’s facilitators in seven adat 
(customary) territories. Former participants 
then established the Peace Papua Network 
(PPN) that works voluntarily to promote 
dialogue, as well as facilitating the preliminary 
consolidation towards dialogues between the 
national government and the people of Papua. 
PPN was established in 2010 to facilitate 
dialogue between the Indonesian government 
and the Papuans and to stimulate communication 
between Papuans to conclude the Papuan 
conflict. This network was established by the 
coordinator of Papua research team of LIPI, who 
is also an editor of Papua Road Map (Supriyono, 
2014: 66), Muridan S. Widjojo, with a Catholic 
priest, the Director of Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat dan 
Teologi (Institute of Philosophy and Theology, 
“STFT” for short) Fajar Timur Jayapura, Pater 
Neles Tebay. Pater Neles Tebay is also an 
author of the book Dialog Jakarta-Papua (SKP 
2009) that received a warm welcome by Papuan 
people. A series of discussions emerged to 
discuss the possibility of future Jakarta-Papua 
dialogues. Pater Neles was present in debates 
and discussions about the dialogue with not 
only intellectuals but also activists from various 
groups.  The idea of dialogue spread quickly and 
received different responses. Many moderate 
groups either Papuan or migrant ethnicities 
supported the idea of dialogue to resolve the 
conflict. However, conservative groups both in 
Papua and Jakarta rejected dialogue because of 
threatening the Indonesian state.
As an organization, PPN is a network 
of voluntary peace facilitators coming from 
diverse cultural, religious, and educational 
backgrounds. Their invidual participations in 
the PPN do not represent the opinion of any 
home institutions. The only thing bonding 
them to PPN is their commitment to work 
for peace in Papua (Widjojo & Tebay 2010). 
Trained facilitators from various civil societies, 
from lecturers to researchers, from higher 
education students to social institutions, from 
religious organizations to ethnic organizations 
and different strategic groups were gathered 
to be willing members of the PPN. Their 
primary task is to connect different groups 
and help Papuans and Indonesians in general 
to establish a Jakarta-Papua dialogue. Right 
now, there are 30 facilitators represent various 
institutions from both Papua and non-Papua, 
which around 30% of the members are women. 
Above that, PPN also has regional coordinators 
in different cities from which they have held 
several public consultations.3 The members 
of PPN work for “Papua Tanah Damai” (Papua 
Peace Land) via dialogue. 
The primary task of PPN members 
is to facilitate the process of perceptual 
synchronization about Papua peace land 
between ethno-religious groups lives in Papua. 
After the establishment of PPN in 2010, it 
has actively promoted the concept through 
a series of public consultations, both inside 
and outside Papua. The PPN has succeeded in 
holding public consultations in 19 regencies 
in Papua. The consultations also involved 
representatives of migrants in six regencies. In 
every public consultation, the public was given 
an understanding of the concept of dialogue 
and was asked to give their opinions and hopes 
for future dialogues.
 PPN also held seminars for higher 
education students, academicians, and women 
to engage with Papuans thoroughly. The 
3 Website JDP, http://jdp-dialog.org/profil/tentang-jdp, 
accessed on March 14, 2016.
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Catholic Church in Papua took the initiative to 
break down the indicators of Papua Tanah Damai 
through a workshop. The indicators were 
discussed and enriched through the workshop 
in Jayapura in June 2011. The workshop brought 
all PPN members, researchers, and experts 
in related fields and representatives from 
various religious organizations in Jayapura. 
Following the series of public consultations 
and workshops, the Papua Peace Conference was 
successfully held in July 2011. All participants 
agreed with the declaration that dialogue is the 
best way to conclude the Papua conflict.”
Papua Peace Conference was hosted by 
the PPN in Jayapura. The event was attended 
by representatives of the region, the Central 
Government, Papuan delegations, and local 
academicians. Among these are Coordinating 
Minister of Politics and Security, Governor of 
Papua, Police Chief, Military Commander, 
Bishop of Diocese Jayapura, Papua Muslim 
Assembly, Synods of Papuan Churches, 
and Papuan Adat Council.4 The conference 
participants were selected through some public 
consultations held by the PPN. Participants 
of the conference represent the aspirations of 
the mainstream of indigenous Papuans. It is 
indicated by the presence of traditional leaders, 
religious, the Papuan Presidium Council, 
which is known critical of government policies. 
The result of the conference is Papua Land 
of Peace Indicators in politics, security, law 
and human rights, social, cultural, economic 
and environmental. The conference chooses 
negotiators representing Papua native to 
dialogue with the Government of Indonesia. 
They are Papuan diaspora, i.e. Rumakiek Rex, 
John Ondawame, Leoni Tanggahma, Octo 
Motte and Benny Wenda. They live in Australia, 
Vanuatu, the Netherlands, USA, and the UK.5
4 * jdp,  ht tp: / /www.jdp-dialog.org/download/
c a t _ v i e w / 1 7 - p e r s - r e l e a s e - j a r i n g a n - d a m a i -
papua?orderby=dmdate_published&ascdesc=DESC, 
accessed on March 13, 2016.
5 Retrieved from http://tabloidjubi.com/2014/10/11/
Reading the declaration of the Papua 
Peace Conference that contains the name of 
those five negotiators finally raised critical 
responses from some participants, the 
Indonesian Government, and Foreign Affairs. 
Some the national government officials were 
struck by reading the name, and since then, the 
government’s trust to PPN and some dialogue 
campaigns were reduced. This incident is an 
unplanned; suddenly emerge spontaneously 
from the conference participants so that the 
committee cannot be prevented because the 
pressure of the members was very enthusiastic. 
Of it was, and then trust the government to the 
PPN, and the work of the dialogue began to 
wane. However, based on experience during 
the decades in which the opinions of Papua 
always silenced, so they are always trying to 
express their views on every occasion. 
One of government responds against 
the 2011 Papua Peace Conference as well 
as international accusation for human right 
abuse is establishing the so-called UP4B 
(Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Papua 
dan Papua Barat, the Presidential Office for 
Speed Development in Papua) at the end of 
2011 (Hernawan, 2013). This institution aims 
to strengthen the coordination of the Papua 
development acceleration. However, the 
UP4B only focuses on quick win programs in 
the educational, health, local economy, and 
infrastructure development sectors. According 
to the majority of Papuans, UP4B has yet 
involved Papuans, especially in security and 
law enforcement issues. They also state that 
UP4B has not provided any protection towards 
the social, economic, and cultural rights of the 
native Papuans. In their perception, security 
policies and freedom of expression displayed 
by the government still uses repressive 
approaches. Much political violence still exists 
committed by Indonesian armed forces, pro-
orang-papua-harus-bicara-pengganti-juru-runding-
papua-ondawame/, accessed January 20, 2016.  
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independent movements, and other armed 
civilian groups. 
Explorative Meetings between National 
Government and Papuan Leaders
Constructive communication is a key 
to reduce the gap of understanding between 
national government officials and Papuan 
people. In 2012, the Office of Vice President 
initiated an explorative meeting between 
Papuan leaders and the national government 
officials. Following the initiatives of Vice 
President Office; LIPI and PPN held a series 
of explorative meetings to facilitate such 
a constructive communication between 
government and Papuan leaders. The meetings 
took place six times in seven different cities, 
namely:  Denpasar,  Manado,  Lombok, 
Yogyakarta, Semarang, Jakarta, and Bogor. 
Non-Government Organizations, Civil societies 
elements, national and local government 
attended those meetings.  The explorative 
meetings aim to build effective communication 
and identify the root of the Jakarta-Papua 
conflict. The meetings were necessary to 
bridge the gap of understanding between the 
Indonesian government and Papuans. 
Since 2013, LIPI and PPN facilitated 
explorative meetings that bring together 
leaders from Papua and Jakarta, as follows 
(Wiratri, 2016: 19-25). The meeting between the 
two sides started with First Explorative meeting 
held in Bali in February 2013. Representatives 
of ministries and agencies in Jakarta (26 
delegations), as well as representatives, 
attended the meeting from Papua. This 
explorative meeting discussed issues that can 
help the parties to create a shared vision that 
is acceptable to all stakeholders for the future 
of Papua and to build mutual trust between 
participants representing various stakeholders 
from Jakarta and Papua. The first explorative 
meeting went very tense. Each representative 
from both ministries and agencies of Jakarta 
and Papuan activists were still suspicious 
of each other. Nevertheless, this session is 
an excellent opportunity to bring the two 
warring factions. At the end of the meeting, all 
participants agreed to meet again in the next 
explorative meeting 
The second explorative meeting was 
held in Manado in April 2013. As previously 
explorative meetings, this meeting also aims 
to build confidence and understanding of the 
problems in Papua, as well as the search for a 
solution acceptable to all parties. Discussions 
on this second explorative meeting specifically 
focused on three aspects: the sociocultural, 
economic, political, and security laws. In this 
session, the government has committed to 
provide a solution to the problem of political 
conflicts, security, socio-economic and other 
development aspects, although the government 
also has obstacles in the coordination 
and implementation of the program. The 
Government also emphasized that they will 
discuss with various interest groups in Papua, 
including Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). 
In August 2013, an explorative meeting 
was held back in Lombok. At this third 
meeting, participants were divided into three 
different groups, namely politic, economic, 
and sociocultural following the educational 
background and their professions. The result 
of the meeting is Peace Papua Indicators. In 
addition, the meeting also produced a short-
term strategy refers to the process of lobbying 
to the Ministry and Government agencies in 
order to create a breakthrough on the issue of 
Papua at the end of the government of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. 
Furthermore, the fourth explorative 
meeting held in January 2014 in Yogyakarta. 
Governor of DIY opened and supported 
this session and advised the Government of 
Indonesia to acknowledge that the issue of 
West Papua as a political issue. The opening 
of the office Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) in 
the UK and the sympathy of the international 
non-governmental organizations is evidence 
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of the problems in Papua. Governor of DIY 
encouraged the Indonesian Government to 
keep an open dialogue with Papuan people 
in 2014 and warned that dialogue could not 
happen if both sides remain in their views. 
The fifth explorative meeting was held 
in September 2014 in Semarang opened by 
the Governor of Central Java. The event was 
attended by almost all participants in the meeting 
of Jakarta and Papua and local government 
officials. Governor supported this explorative 
meeting and stated that Papua is an integral 
part of Indonesia. The meeting is expected to 
be a new approach to building a stable and 
peaceful Papua through a dialogical approach 
towards reconciliation Papua. The meeting 
was attended about 41 participants from 
Jakarta and Papua, including representatives 
of the ministries and agencies to implement 
policies and programs in Papua following 
their respective responsibilities. This meeting 
resulted in a policy paper submitted directly to 
the President Joko Widodo in September 2014. 
Based on the policy paper presented by 
the PPN, The President implemented some 
policies to increase the confidence of the 
people of Papua to the government, namely the 
liberation of political prisoners/detainees and 
providing access to foreign journalists to Papua. 
In May 2015, the President granted clemency to 
the five political prisoners in Papua. These five 
political prisoners were convicted of Arsenal 
burglary in Wamena in 2003. This effort is the 
first step to building Papua with the approach 
of peace and prosperity. Granting clemency 
can be interpreted as a policy reconciliation to 
realize Papua peace. In addition, the provision 
of the widest access for foreign journalists to 
Papua is evidence of press freedom prevail 
throughout Indonesia and in the absence of 
discrimination against Papuans. However, 
the reality of political institutions and security 
does not fully support this policy; for example, 
they only allow foreign journalists who are 
considered not discredit the Indonesian 
government. 
In February 2015, the sixth explorative 
meeting held in Jakarta, attended by Coordinating 
Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 
and the Minister of Women’s Empowerment. 
The minister claimed to have a strategy of 
development in Papua and West Papua Provinces 
using welfare approach. The presence of two 
ministers in the explorative event showed a 
high appreciation at the PPN. It is magnificent 
at building trust Papuan representative because 
they believe that this forum can become a place 
for their aspirations. Furthermore, the seventh 
explorative meeting in November 2015 in Bogor, 
to discuss the urgency of the cessation of violence 
in Papua and the internationalization of Papua 
issues. The meeting discussed the root causes 
of the political, legal, security and human rights 
(HAM) in Papua. Another topic discussed is 
the anticipation of political violence following 
local elections simultaneously on December 9, 
2015. Based on the series of explorative meeting, 
it can be found out that continuously informal 
communication between national government 
officials and Papuan leaders is necessary to 
reduce the gap of understanding related to 
causes and problems of Papuan conflict. At least, 
the meeting can be a space for connecting the 
conflicting ideas and parties into table peacefully.
Methods
This article is based on my study on 
peace campaigns conducted by the Indonesia 
Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan 
Indonesia, LIPI) and the Peace Papua Network 
(PPN, Jaringan Damai Papua, JDP) between 
2013 and 2016. Their campaign consists of a 
series of explorative meeting, expert meeting, 
and media briefing in Jakarta. I then analyzed 
information from these activities by a set 
of literature reviews on the contemporary 
Papuan studies and archival research. Besides 
to confirm the collected information and 
analysis, some interviews are carried out in 
Jakarta. Finally, information collected from 
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observations, previous studies, and interviews 
convergent into analytical arguments. The 
method of analysis of is following the case, 
i.e., the establishment of PPN and its peaceful 
campaigns both in Jakarta and Papua.
Results and Discussion
The Results of Explorative Meetings and Its 
Implications on Peace Building
Through a series of explorative meetings, 
PPN formulates eight problems faced by 
Papuan. These issues are: (i) vertical conflicts 
include stigma separatists, banning the use 
of symbols region, violence committed by 
Indonesian forces and armed groups, and 
conflicts of Indonesian nationalism versus 
ethnonationalism Papua, (ii) political violence 
in local elections , division and corruption, 
(iii) the inconsistency of government policy 
with its implementation especially its less 
attention to local values, (iv) the obstacles to 
the implementation of good governance, (v) 
the policy on state security but not on human 
security, (vi) disharmony implementation 
of modern and traditional economy as well 
as the rights of indigenous peoples to the 
natural resources that are not protected, (vii) 
limited and uneven qualified teaching staff 
and infrastructure of education, and the school 
curriculum that have not accommodated the 
cultural values  of Papua, (viii) limited and not 
the prevalence of qualified health personnel, 
limited health infrastructure quality, less 
nutrition community programs, high mortality 
rate of pregnant women and children, and 
high levels of Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV) (TKP LIPI & JDP, 2015, p. 3-4). 
 Explorative meeting participants 
from Papua more respond to the problem 
of stigmatization separatism, the use of 
symbols of Papuan culture, and violence in 
Puncak Jaya where a number of Indonesian 
armed forces and Free Papua Organization 
involved in armed conflict. Another topic is 
the number of policies and regulations for 
Papua, but the people of Papua sees just a 
little bit of policies and regulations that have 
been implemented, while some of them are 
failed to be implemented such as Act No. 
1/2001 on the Papua Special Autonomy. On 
that occasion, the Government said that they 
have committed to provide a solution to the 
problem of political conflicts, security, socio-
economic and other development aspects, 
although the government also has obstacles 
in the coordination and implementation of the 
program. The Government also emphasized 
that they will discuss with various interest 
groups in Papua, including Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka (OPM).
Security problems, law, and politics 
became sensitive issues at the explorative 
meeting. Some questions that need to be 
answers related to the safety aspects, law, 
politics, not just the problem of development 
in Papua. There are still different points 
of view on the root of the problem, and 
the problem in Papua is based on a certain 
reality, namely nationalism Indonesian and 
Papuan nationalism. Also, there are different 
perceptions between restrictions on access to 
Papua by the lack of access to Papua, especially 
for foreign journalists. 
Socioeconomic problems in Papua are 
getting a lot of attention from the participants 
in the dialogue. Such as the need to improve 
coordination and synergies; enhance the 
quality of the management of natural resources; 
community empowerment; Papua resource 
management by involving local government, 
communities, and enterprises; and build 
infrastructure, especially for education and 
health services. In the sector of teaching services, 
it is recommended to create a specialized 
curriculum in Papua taking into remote areas 
considering the inability of some ethnic groups 
to talk with Indonesian and education levels 
are low compared to other provinces. Another 
recommendation is to open a boarding school 
related to the difficulty of access to some 
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areas, boarding schools for certain ethnic 
groups. Those in the health care sector are 
recommended to do the following: improving 
health care and to combine traditional and 
modern health care to remote communities 
in Papua. Those in the economic sector are 
supported for greater recognition of the land 
and ownership rights. 
 Social and cultural problems in Papua 
which also discussed in the explorative meeting 
primarily about problems of education in 
Papua and the need to view culture as a totality 
and Papua determinant factor in governance 
and social life in Papua. Another issue is the 
need to use local languages/dialects as part 
of the curriculum. Another thing discussed 
included customary land and customary rights 
over customary land mapping and organizing 
and setting back the Papua Adat Council 
(Dewan Adat Papua, DAP) (LIPI and JDP, 
2015).6 This topic has been widely discussed 
in academic discourse, for example, Martanto 
(2007: 183-184) says that the exploitation of 
natural resources in Papua land affected on the 
sustainability of Papuan tribes because their 
everyday life depends on nature.
 One implication of explorative meetings 
is that the idea of dialogue become wider 
discussed among both national government 
officials and Papuan people. Some moderate 
national government officials begin to 
understand that the dialogue is necessary 
to resolve social and economic issues. Event 
President Jokowi said that he is willing to 
dialogue with Papuan people including those 
who want to free Papua. However, the national 
government has no a comprehensive road 
map of peaceful dialogue. On the other side, 
some leaders of Papuan church and tribal 
organizations also support the idea of dialogue 
to end political violence in Papua land. 
Nevertheless, the results of explorative 
6 The summary of explorative meetings results, “an effort 
to achieve consensus for peace in Papua.”  
meetings are limited to discourse on a personal 
level, namely the government officials as well 
as leaders of Papua. Government delegations in 
the explorative meeting, in reality, do not have 
authority when they return to their institutions. 
It is due to the strong ideology of chauvinist-
nationalism among national government 
officials that legacy of the authoritarian New 
Order regime. The political situation in Papua 
showed that the escalation of political violence 
committed by the military and police against 
the Papuans still occurs. Increasing violence in 
Papua reduces the government’s commitment to 
the peaceful settlement of Papua. This violence 
is ranging from kidnappings, shootings, arrests, 
killings by state officials or by civilians in 
various regions of Papua and West Papua. 
Although the Indonesian government 
has allocated IDR 203.5 trillion to Papua 
between 2002 and 2015, the Papua issue is yet 
to be resolved.7 ELSAM (2015: 29) noted some 
political violence committed by Indonesian 
security forces in Papua and West Papua 
province in 2012 and 2013. During 2012, there 
have been 139 acts of violence perpetrated by 
security forces against indigenous Papuans. 
As a result, 40 civilians died, and 155 people 
were injured, three military members were 
assassinated, ten people were injured, and 
three armed civilians were killed, and two 
people were injured. Acts of violence in 2013 it 
increased to 151 events are accompanied by an 
increase in the number of victims. In that year, 
as result of political violence, 106 civilians died, 
and 220 people were injured, one police officer 
was killed, and ten police officers were injured, 
13 military members were assassinated were 
killed and five people injured, and five armed 
civilians killed. The International Coalition of 
7 This is all funds including special autonomy, 
infrastructure and other transfer  from the national 
government to both Papua and West Papua province. 
Presented by a speaker from government in an 
explorative meeting with the media in Jakarta on May 
11, 2016. 
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West Papua (ICP, 2017: 9) reports that there are 
76 cases of torture and 8 cases of extra-judicial 
killing in 2014. The number of torture cases 
reduces into 19 but the number extrajudicial 
killing cases increased into 10 in 2015.
Another problem is the increasingly 
smaller space for Papuan political expression. 
Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the 1945 
Indonesian constitution has been reduced by the 
police in Papua since 2012. It can be observed 
in the peaceful demonstrations conducted by 
the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) 
was dissolved, and its leaders have always 
filed by the court. The demand for the right 
of self-determination by KNPB should not be 
taken with the legal and security approach 
but should be responded with a dialogical 
approach. Increasing security crackdown on 
demonstrations KNPB, the growing campaign 
for independence abroad carried out by 
diaspora political movement in Papua. In 
fact, the security forces had done to overreact 
when they arrested the Catholic priest during 
a demonstration for demanding the resolution 
of Paniai case.  The escalation of violence and 
restriction of freedom expression in Papua land 
tend to lead the internationalization of Papuan 
issues. 
In December 2014, all Papuan liberation 
organizations, namely the West Papua National 
Coalition Liberation (WPNCL), National 
Parliament of West Papua (NPWP), West Papua 
Federal Republic State, United in Vanuatu 
under the United Liberation Movement for 
West Papua (ULMWP). In June 2015, the 
ULMWP was accepted as an observer in 
Melanesian Spearhead Group, a cooperative 
organization of Melanesian states in the Pacific. 
However, the Indonesian government also 
established Melanesia-Indonesia (Melindo), 
which is represented by five provinces (Papua, 
West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku and East 
Nusa Tenggara), which was also included in 
MSG as an associate member. The ULMWP is 
more popular than Melindo in Papua, getting 
a stronghold in all regencies and cities in the 
whole Papua land. The works of PPN, therefore, 
are still needed to consolidate Papuans and to 
prepare the dialogue between Papuans and the 
Indonesian government. In such a dialogue, 
Papuan people may be represented by the 
ULMWP (Pamungkas, 2016: 3-5). 
Conclusion
Based on the descriptions above, it is 
concluded that PPN has actively and intensively 
campaigned for Papua Peace Land. The campaign 
was conducted via a series of public consultations 
with Papuan and migrant living in Papua, the 2011 
Papua Peace Conference, and some explorative 
meetings between Indonesian government 
officials and Papuan leaders. As a result, the idea 
of opening a national dialogue has been widely 
accepted in both Papuan and migrant living in 
Papua. The Indonesian government has also 
recognized the idea of dialogue in the context of 
national integration. 
The idea of dialogue to settle the Papuan 
conflict received a positive response from 
both parties due to they belief that “dialogue 
will not kill anyone.” However, it was also 
acknowledged that the people who died 
during the conflicted times were not able to 
attend the dialogue. Dialogue is one condition 
for reconciliation and peace in Papua land. 
In the future, the talks concerning the Papua-
Indonesia integration should be conducted in 
peaceable ways. The security approach is no 
longer acceptable by international communities. 
This approach, therefore, will not contribute to 
the peace building and maintaining national 
integration, but vice versa shall make Papuan 
people away from Indonesia. 
This study demonstrates that the 
continuous informal communication between 
conflicted parties is necessary to increase 
mutual trust, but not enough without a formal 
dialogue for reconciliation. Several explorative 
meetings between national government officers 
and Papuan leaders do not manifest in a 
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dialogue for reconciliation between the national 
government and Papuan resistance’s movement 
represented by the United Liberation Movement 
for West Papua (ULMWP). Consequently, 
political violence and marginalization against 
Papuan continue in line with the exploitation 
of natural resources. Here, without dialogue, 
positive peace in Papua land is hard to be 
realized.
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